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1Detecting Word Substitutions in Text
SW. Fong, D. Roussinov, D.B. Skillicorn Member, IEEE
Abstract— Searching for words on a watchlist is one way
in which large-scale surveillance of communication can
be done, for example in intelligence and counterterrorism
settings. One obvious defense is to replace words that
might attract attention to a message with other, more
innocuous, words. For example, the sentence “the attack
will be tomorrow” might be altered to “the complex will
be tomorrow”, since ‘complex’ is a word whose frequency
is close to that of ‘attack’.
Such substitutions are readily detectable by humans
since they do not make sense. We address the problem
of detecting such substitutions automatically, by looking
for discrepancies between words and their contexts, and
using only syntactic information. We define a set of
measures, each of which is quite weak, but which together
produce per-sentence detection rates around 90% with
false positive rates around 10%. Rules for combining per-
sentence detection into per-message detection can reduce
the false positive and false negative rates for messages to
practical levels. We test the approach using sentences from
the Enron email and Brown corpora, representing informal
and formal text respectively.
Index Terms— textual analysis, counterterrorism, word
frequencies, data mining, pointwise mutual information,
co-occurrence.
I. MOTIVATION
Groups that are involved in illicit acts, whether
terrorists or criminals, must communicate with one
another. They are surely aware of the possibility that
both the existence of their communications, which
provides evidence of their links to one another, and
the content of their communications, which provides
evidence of their thinking and actions, are targets for
intelligence or law enforcement.
How they attempt to conceal their communication
depends on what kind of interception is being done.
If interception is being done for particular senders
and receivers, then only the content of the messages
can be concealed, and encryption may be the tech-
nique of choice. If interception is being done by
automated scanning of large numbers of messages,
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for example by government intelligence programs
or organizational analysis of email, obfuscation of
content may be a better technique. In this setting,
encryption draws attention to a message that might
otherwise not be noticed.
The first level of analysis in widespread message
interception is to scan for the presence of words
from a list of significant words, a watchlist. Mes-
sages that contain such words may be selected for
further analysis, for example using more-powerful
text-mining algorithms, or even human analysis.
Obfuscation replaces words that are, or may be, on
the watchlist by more innocuous words, making the
message seem more ‘ordinary’, and so likely to be
unselected for further analysis.
The form of the substitutions depends on whether
the screening process is done by humans or by
software. For example, al Qaeda was, for a time,
using the word ‘wedding’ in place of the word
‘attack’. This substitution is obviously aimed at
human readers, since many of the things that might
be said about an attack might also be said about a
wedding: they both happen at particular places and
times, and require coordination to make sure that
all the participants arrive at the proper time.
Humans use semantic and deep contextual infor-
mation to judge whether a substitution has occurred.
Software is limited to surface properties, for ex-
ample frequencies of words and strings of words.
Avoiding detection by software may require paying
more attention to such properties. For example, ‘at-
tack’ is the 1072nd most common word in English
(according to a list at www.wordcount.org/
main.php), while ‘wedding’ is the 2912nd most
common word, creating the possibility of detecting
the example al Qaeda substitution automatically on
the basis of frequency differences.
When such substitutions must be made ‘on the
fly’, for example during phone calls and perhaps
emails, and particularly under conditions of stress,
it is plausible that the choices for replacement
words may be poor, and so the presence of a
substitution easily detectable [1]. However, word
2frequency information is readily available, so it is
possible that, in ordinary circumstances, a terrorist
or criminal group might adopt a standard set of
substitutions, in which words they do not wish
to use are replaced by other words with similar
frequencies. This paper addresses the problem of
detecting such substitutions.
As recent experience with popular web sites such
as MySpace.com indicates, the electronic commu-
nication facilitated by those sites may provide leads
to detecting and thwarting violent plots [2]. Since
much of that communication is publicly available,
perpetrators may choose to replace words that might
attract attention. It is also known that Salafist terror-
ist use web sites for internal communication, and for
information dissemination. Posting online content
that can facilitate terrorist acts, such as posting
instructions on how to make explosives, poisons,
and so on has recently been made illegal and tech-
niques to detect such malevolent content have been
explored [3]. The authors of such materials may try
to avoid certain eye-catching words, replacing them
with more ordinary ones.
The contribution of this paper is the design of a
set of measures that can be applied to sentences,
and whose values are predictive of the presence
of a substituted word. Each of these measures is
relatively weak on its own. However, each makes
errors on different kinds of sentences, so combining
them into ensembles produces substitution detectors
with high accuracies. Detection rates of around 90%
with false positive rates around 10% are achieved.
We demonstrate using sentences drawn from the
Enron email corpus and the Brown news corpus.
II. RELATED WORK
A standard model for many natural language
problems is to assume a language-generation model
that describes how sentences in English are gen-
erated, and an alteration model that describes how
such sentences are changed in the problem domain
being considered. The probability of a given sen-
tence w being generated is given by some probabil-
ity P (w). The alternation model changes w to some
new sentence y with probability P (y | w). The task
is to estimate w given y [4].
In the problem we address, the alteration model
is the replacement of some set of words with other
words of similar frequency. We are interested, not
in predicting the original sentence (which would
be extremely difficult), but in detecting when P (w)
differs significantly from P (y). Some early results
have already appeared [5].
An easier variant, the problem of detecting a
substituted word with substantially different fre-
quency from the word it replaces was addressed
by Skillicorn [1]. This work considered, not indi-
vidual sentences, but large collections of messages.
The existence of identical substitutions in different
messages was shown to be detectable, via the corre-
lations that were created among them, using matrix
decompositions.
Speech recognition uses an alteration model in
which text is converted to an analogue wave form.
Predicting the original sentence w is done using the
left context of the current word and a statistical
model of word co-occurrences. Such algorithms
are heavily dependent on left-to-right processing,
backing up to a different interpretation when the
next word becomes sufficiently unlikely [6]. Speech
recognition differs from the problem addressed here
because it is limited to the left context, whereas
we are able to access both left and right contextual
information. Further, speech recognition techniques
must be lightweight because of the need for near
realtime performance.
Detecting misspellings uses an alteration model
that incorporates common keystroke errors, them-
selves derived from visual, aural, and grammatical
error patterns [7]. This problem differs from the
problem addressed here because misspelled words
are easily distinguishable from ordinary words, and
because the alterations are of limited forms.
Spam detection is closer to our problem in the
sense that the alteration model assumes human-
directed transformations with the intent to evade
detection by software. For example, SpamAssassin
uses rules that will detect words such as ‘V!agra’.
The problem is similar to detecting misspellings,
except that the transformations have properties that
preserve certain visual qualities rather than re-
flecting lexical formation errors. Lee and Ng [8]
detect word-level manipulations typical of spam,
using Hidden Markov Models. They addressed the
question of whether an email contains examples of
obfuscation by word substitution, expecting this to
be simpler than recovering the text that had been
replaced. They remark that detecting substitution
at all is ‘surprisingly difficult’ [8, Section 5] and
3achieve prediction accuracies of around 70% using
word-level features.
The task of detecting replacements can be con-
sidered as the task of detecting words that are “out
of context,” which means surrounded by the words
with which they typically do not co-occur. The
task of detecting typical co-occurrences of words
in specific contexts was considered in [9, 10].
Using Google (or other Internet search engines
with large coverage) to check for spelling and gram-
matical errors has been suggested in the academic
literature [11]. Indeed, since substitutions frequently
result in incorrect grammatically or semantically
formed phrases, detecting such errors may also
detect substitutions. For example, the erroneous use
of a word in the phrase “had ice-cream for desert”
means that it occurs on the Web only 44 times,
according to Google. The correct phrase “had ice-
cream for dessert” occurs 316 times. However, no
evaluation was performed in [11] and we are not
aware of any other formal studies in this direction.
III. MEASURES
We expect that a substituted word creates an
anomaly in the flow of a sentence because its
meaning does not fit with the meanings of the words
around it in the sentence. It was selected on the basis
of a much shallower property, its overall frequency
in English.
If the substituted word’s frequency is almost the
same as that of the word it replaces, then we must
look at elements of the context in which it appears
to find ways to detect its presence. For a human this
is often easy, since a word of equivalent frequency is
unlikely to make sense in context. However, some-
times, especially for common words with multiple
meanings, replacement can be difficult even for
humans to detect. For example, the words ‘results’
and ‘conditions’ have almost the same frequency, so
altering the sentence “the results are quite poor” to
“the conditions are quite poor” is difficult to detect
either semantically or syntactically.
We wish to detect substitutions of equally fre-
quent words without direct semantic information.
An obvious starting point is to consider the frequen-
cies of pairs of words (2-grams). If we consider all
of the 2-grams of a sentence, then a substituted word
appears as a member of two adjacent 2-grams. We
might expect that the frequencies of these 2-grams
would be lower than those of the 2-grams around
them because these particular pairs of words do not
belong together semantically; and this is reflected in
their observed frequencies. 2-grams consider small
contexts on either side of the substituted word.
Unfortunately, Ferrer i Cancho and Sole´ [12] have
shown that the graph of English word adjacencies
has a small-world property. Words can be imagined
as occurring in a layered sphere, with very common
words near the center and rare words towards the
outside. Their result implies that any word is al-
most always both preceded and followed by a very
common word. In our setting, this means that the
immediate context of a substituted word is likely
to tell us little about how well that word ‘fits’
into a sentence. Measures that are able to consider
much larger contexts are needed. Of course, we
could consider 3-grams, 4-grams, and so on to get
information about larger contexts.
We use large text repositories as oracles for the
natural frequency of words, bags of words, and
strings. It has been observed that even relatively
short strings do not occur verbatim, even in the
largest text repository. For example, Zhu and Rosen-
feld [13] noted that about ten percent of 3-grams
from fresh news stories did not already appear in
several search engines. Hence it is likely that we can
get no frequency information about many strings of
words of length 3 or longer.
We will use the following sentence as a running
example: “we expect that the attack will happen
tonight”. As expected, this exact sentence occurs
with zero frequency at both Yahoo and Google, even
though it is not a particularly surprising sentence. In
this sentence, the word ‘attack’ is the word mostly
likely to single this sentence out for further analysis.
A word with similar frequency to ‘attack’ in English
is ‘campaign’, so the sentence with a substitution
we will consider is “we expect that the campaign
will happen tonight”. (Note that the sentence with
the substitution is not semantically more surprising
than the original sentence in this particular case.)
We have designed and adapted a set of measures
that view the relationship between a word and its
contexts in different ways. Some of these are based
on the frequencies of short strings, while others treat
sentences and strings of words as bags of words.
Here are the measures:
a) Sentence Oddity (SO): This measure con-
siders a sentence as a whole, and the relationship
4between the entire sentence, and the sentence with a
particular word of interest deleted. As noted above,
we can only get useful frequency estimates by
treating sentences as bags of words, that is we
generate search engine queries with a list of the
words in the sentence, rather than treating the entire
sentence as a quoted string.
Sentence oddity is based on the observation that
removing a contextually appropriate word from a
sentence should not substantially change the fre-
quency of the resulting bag of words in comparison
to the frequency of the entire sentence, since the
contextually appropriate word co-occurs frequently
with the other words in the sentence. On the other
hand, removing a contextually inappropriate word
might be expected to produce a large increase in
frequency of the remaining bag of words because
it would only rarely co-occur with the other words.
Hence we define the sentence oddity of a sentence
with respect to a particular target word as:
SO =
frequency of bag of words, target word removed
frequency of entire bag of words
Sentence oddity should be large for a sentence in
which a word has been substituted.
The frequency, at Yahoo, of our example sentence
with ‘attack’ removed is 5.78M, while the frequency
of the entire sentence is 2.42M, so the sentence
oddity of the example sentence is 2.4 (=5.78/2.42).
For the sentence with the substitution, the frequency
of the entire sentence is 1.63M so the sentence
oddity is 3.5 (=5.78/1.63). As expected, the sentence
oddity of the sentence containing the substitution is
significantly larger than that of the original sentence.
b) Enhanced Sentence Oddity (ESO): The nu-
merator in the sentence oddity measure includes
some sentences that contain the word being consid-
ered; that is the numerator counts some sentences
that are also counted in the denominator. It is
useful to define enhanced sentence oddity in which
the numerator explicitly excludes the word being
considered. Hence we define the enhanced sentence
oddity of a sentence with respect to a particular
target word as:
ESO =
frequency of bag of words, target word excluded
frequency of entire bag of words
Again, enhanced sentence oddity should be large for
a sentence in which a word has been substituted.
For the example sentence, the frequency of the
numerator is 3.36M, giving an enhanced sentence
TABLE I
EXAMPLE K-GRAMS
“the attack will happen” f = 489
“the attack will happen tonight” f = 1
“that the attack will happen” f = 204
“expect that the attack will happen” f = 0
“the campaign will happen” f = 26
“the campaign will happen tonight” f = 0
“that the campaign will happen” f = 0
oddity of 1.4 (=3.36/2.42). For the sentence with
the substitution, the frequency of the numerator is
4.14M, giving an enhanced sentence oddity of 2.5
(=4.14/1.63).
c) k-gram frequencies (k-GRAM): The diffi-
culties of using the frequencies of exact strings
containing the word of interest are illustrated by
looking at the frequencies of substrings of our
example sentences. These are illustrated in Table I.
Frequencies overall are lower for the fragments
of the sentence that contains the substitution, but
we would not, in practice, know the frequencies
of the original sentence to compare them with.
Frequencies of exact strings are often so low that
they are difficult to work with.
k-grams are measures of frequency for strings
of limited length. We define the left k-gram of a
word to be the string that begins with the word
and extends left, up to and including the first non-
stopword. Similarly, the right k-gram of a word is
the string that begins with the word and extends
right, up to and including the first non-stopword.
What constitutes a stopword might vary with ap-
plication domain; we use the stopword list from
Wordnet 2.1 in our work.
In our ordinary example sentence, the left k-gram
of ‘attack’ is “expect that the attack” (f = 50) and
the right k-gram is “attack will happen” (f = 9260).
In the sentence with a substitution, the left k-gram
of ‘campaign’ is “expect that the campaign” (f =
77) and the right k-gram is “campaign will happen”
(f = 132).
We expect that, in general, k-grams will be
smaller for sentences containing a substitution, al-
though in the example this is only true for the
right k-gram. Left and right k-grams capture signif-
icantly different information about the structure of
sentences, which is not surprising given the linear
way in which English is understood.
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a noun is a noun or noun phrase that is more
general in a taxonomy of meaning. For example,
the hypernym of ‘cat’ is ‘feline’.
Hypernyms themselves have hypernyms, so there
are chains of increasing generality. For example,
a chain contain ‘cat’ is: “kitty; house cat; cat;
feline; carnivore; eutherian mammal”. Obviously
the frequencies of the nouns and noun phrases
along such a chain vary widely. A given word often
has several hypernyms, usually reflecting different
possible meanings.
Now consider the frequencies of a sentence (con-
sidered as a bag of words) and the same sentence
where a particular word has been replaced by its
hypernym. If the word is contextually appropriate
then the sentence with the hypernym is likely to
be more unusual, perhaps sounding a bit pompous
(“the feline sat by the fire purring.”). On the other
hand, if the word is not contextually appropriate,
the sentence with the hypernym is likely to be more
usual, since the hypernym is a more general concept.
Hence we define the hypernym oddity of a sentence
with respect to a particular word as:
HO = fH − f
where f is the frequency of a sentence, regarded
as a bag of words; and fH is the frequency of a
bag of words in which the word under consideration
has been replaced by its hypernym. We expect
this measure to be close to zero or negative when
the word is contextually appropriate, but positive
when the word is contextually inappropriate, and so
probably a substitution.
For our example sentences, one hypernym for
‘attack’ is ‘operation’ and one hypernym for ‘cam-
paign’ is ‘race’. The relevant frequencies for these
sentences are given in Table II, giving hypernym
oddity scores of −1.11M for the ordinary sentence
and 340, 000 for the sentence containing a substitu-
tion.
Because a given word typically has more than one
hypernym, we can define the maximum, minimum,
and average hypernym oddities over the possible
choices of hypernym.
Hypernym chains tend to alternate between quite
ordinary words and quite technical words. Hence the
use of hyponyms (words below the word of interest
in such a chain) give qualitatively similar results.
TABLE II
HYPERNYM EXAMPLES
Bag of words Frequency
we expect that the attack will happen tonight f = 2.42M
we expect that the operation will happen tonight fH = 1.31M
we expect that the campaign will happen tonight f = 1.63M
we expect that the race will happen tonight fH = 1.97M
e) Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI):
Pointwise mutual information attempts to measure
the strength of an association between a word and
some other string, either a word, a phrase, a sen-
tence, or an entire document. We adapt this idea to
measure the strength of association between a word
that may be a substitution, and phrases of increasing
length adjacent to it.
Consider a word of interest and an adjacent region
of the sentence. The pointwise mutual information
of the pair is given by:
PMI =
p(word)p(adjacent region)
p(word + adjacent region)
where p() is a probability, and + is concatenation in
either direction, that is of the word with a phrase that
follows it, or of the word with a phrase that precedes
it. We can approximate the required probabilities
as inverse frequencies. This results in values that
are extremely small, so we take the reciprocal and
define:
PMI =
f(word)f(adjacent region)
f(word + adjacent region)
where the frequencies are for quoted string searches.
With this definition, PMI values are larger for words
that are more unusual in their context. These values
are so large that we present them divided by 109 to
make them more readable.
The pointwise mutual information measure (PMI)
is used extensively in data mining, and was intro-
duced into text mining by Turney [14]. The advan-
tage of using PMI for substitution detection is that it
goes beyond our k-grams and sentence bag of words
measures since it uses the frequency information
of the constituents of phrases or sentences. The
intuition behind applying the PMI measure is that
if the target word is not contextually inappropriate
(not substituted), then it should be a part of some
stable phrase. Such a stable phrase should occur on
6the Web (or a suitably large corpus) more often than
random chance dictates.
Although the PMI formula uses probabilities of
occurrences and co-occurrence, it has been com-
monly approximated by ratios of numbers of oc-
currences on the Web (or any sufficiently large
repository) [14]. While no one has formally studied
the accuracy of such an approximation, we can
intuitively justify it by assuming that all pages are
of approximately the same size, and the evaluated
words are distributed uniformly throughout each
page.
We calculate a family of pointwise mutual infor-
mation measures using nested adjacent regions that
increase in length until their observed frequencies
drop to zero. Adjacent regions can precede or follow
the word of interest. We compute the maximum
pointwise mutual informations over all choices of
adjacent regions of text.
PMI scores for some of the adjacent regions of
the example sentence are shown in Table III; and for
some of the adjacent regions in the sentence with a
substitution are shown in Table IV.
The string “attack will happen tonight” occurs
only once, and the string “campaign will happen
tonight” never occurs, so these regions cannot be
made larger.
Performing a full or partial grammatical parse and
limiting the application of measures to the related
components of sentences would probably increase
the effectiveness of these measures. However, it
would significantly slow down the processing.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Frequency Oracles
We use the Yahoo web service search interface
as a frequency oracle for frequencies of words, bags
of words, and quoted strings. Yahoo claims to index
about 20 billion pages.
There are several practical issues in using such
frequency oracles. First, we use the number of pages
returned by a search as a surrogate for the natural
frequency of the search terms. This implicitly as-
sumes that every word occurs the same number of
times in each page where it appears. For sets of
words, this assumption also fails to capture how far
apart they appear in the page. We justify this on the
grounds that most searches return a large number of
pages, so considerable smoothing occurs.
Second, the way in which stopwords are handled
by search engines is opaque. For example, at Yahoo,
the quoted string “chase the dog” occurs 2990 times,
while the quoted string “chase dog” occurs only
1290 times, so clearly stopwords are taken into
account in such searches. However, the bag of words
{chase the dog} occurs 7,610,000 times while the
bag of words {chase dog} occurs only 7,030,000
times, which seems counterintuitive.
Third, word order seems to be significant, even
in bag of word searches. The bag {natural language
processing} occurs 5,750,000 times while {natural
processing language} occurs 6,210,000 times.
Fourth, the frequencies reported by Yahoo and
Google are substantially different in ways that can-
not be easily accounted for on the basis of different
numbers of kinds of pages indexed. For example,
Google reports that the quoted string “chase the
dog” occurs 18,200 times, a factor of 6 greater than
Yahoo’s frequency.
These issues mean that frequency data must be
treated with caution, especially when the frequen-
cies are low. However, search engines index ex-
tremely large amounts of textual data, so we expect
that, in a broad sense, they capture properties of
natural language well.
We also use the British National Corpus (BNC)
[15] as a resource for word frequencies. The BNC
contains 100 million words collected from both
spoken and written English. Frequency ranked lists
of words, including lists for particular parts of
speech, are derived from the corpus.
B. Test Data
We apply our measures to two datasets, one
derived from the Enron email corpus, and the other
from the Brown news corpus.
The Enron email corpus was made public as the
result of the prosecutions of Enron personnel. It
contains slightly fewer than half a million emails
(many of them duplicates) to and from Enron staff
over a period of three and a half years. The authors
of the emails never expected that it would be made
public, so it is a good sample of informal writing, by
a large number of authors, from many backgrounds.
As such, it is a good surrogate for the kinds of
messages that might be intercepted in an intelligence
or law-enforcement context.
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PMI SCORES FOR THE EXAMPLE SENTENCE
word = ‘attack’, f(attack) = 174M PMI
‘the attack’ f(the attack) = 19.1M f(the) = 6, 580M 59.94
‘that the attack’ f(that the attack) = 703, 000 f(that the) = 943M 233.4
‘expect that the attack’ f(expect that the attack) = 50 f(expect that the) = 2.24M 7795
‘attack will’ f(attack will) = 811, 000 f(will) = 2.67B 572.8
‘attack will happen’ f(attack will happen) = 9260 f(will happen) = 19.3M 362.7
TABLE IV
PMI SCORES FOR THE SENTENCE WITH A SUBSTITUTION
word = ‘campaign’, f(campaign) = 167M PMI
‘the campaign’ f(the campaign) = 22.8M f(the) = 6, 580M 48.20
‘that the campaign’ f(that the campaign) = 575, 000 f(that the) = 943M 273.8
‘expect that the campaign’ f(expect that the campaign) = 77 f(expect that the) = 2.24M 4858
‘campaign will’ f(campaign will) = 2.43M f(will) = 2.67B 183
‘campaign will happen’ f(campaign will happen) = 132 f(will happen) = 19.3M 24417
For the Enron email corpus, sentences containing
between five and fifteen words, inclusive, were se-
lected, giving a total of 712,662 candidate sentences.
We limited our attention to substitution of nouns,
since these carry the greater part of the content
of sentences. Sentences were uniformly randomly
selected from the set of candidate sentences, but
discarded if the first noun in the sentence (a) was
not present on the BNC noun list, or (b) did not
have a hypernym known to Wordnet. This removed
primarily sentences that were not English.
A set of 1714 sentences representative of infor-
mal written English resulted. A new set of 1714
sentences, each containing a substitution, was con-
structed from the Enron set by replacing the first
noun in each sentence by the noun with next-
highest frequency on the BNC noun frequency list.
Some examples of pairs of ordinary sentences and
sentences with a substitution are:
an agent will assist you with checked
baggage
an vote will assist you with checked bag-
gage
my lunch contained white tuna she or-
dered a parfait
my package contained white tuna she or-
dered a parfait
please let me know if you have this infor-
mation
please let me know if you have this men
We therefore have two sets of sentences, labelled
as ordinary or containing a substitution, to which
we can apply our measures.
The Brown news corpus contains about one mil-
lion words, from a variety of more formal texts,
including news and commentary. We chose this set
for comparison because we expect that the writing
style is much more formal than in the Enron emails,
all the more so as it was collected in 1961. We
expected that substitutions might be easier to detect
in this data.
The same processing was carried out to select a
set of 566 ordinary sentences; and the first noun
in each sentence was replaced using the same al-
gorithm to produce a set of 566 sentences that
contained a substitution. Some examples of pairs of
ordinary sentences and sentences with a substitution
are:
it was one of a series of recommendations
by the texas research league
it was one of a bank of recommendations
by the texas research league
the remainder of the college requirement
would be in general subjects
the attendance of the college requirement
would be in general subjects
a copy was released to the press
a object was released to the press
These sentences are indeed more formal than those
of the Enron corpus.
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OPTIMAL BOUNDARY VALUES BASED ON INFORMATION GAIN
Measure Boundary
Sentence oddity 4.6
Enhanced sentence oddity 0.98
Left k-gram 155
Right k-gram 612
Average k-gram 6173
Minimum hypernym oddity -89129
Maximum hypernym oddity -6
Average hypernym oddity -6
Maximum PMI 1.34
C. Experiments
An appropriate decision surface for each measure
was determined by training it using the J48 decision
tree provided by Weka (www.cs.waikato.ac.
nz/ml/weka) with the default parameters. At the
same time, this gives an estimate of the performance
of each measure as an independent classifier. Per-
formance was estimated using a 75% training set
and 25% test set, and also by using 10-fold cross
validation.
Since each of decision trees for individual mea-
sures is training on a dataset with a single attribute
(the measure score), the attribute decision bound-
ary at the root of each tree represents the best
split point based on information gain. These values
provide an insight into the meaningful distinctions
for each measure. Boundary values are shown in
Table V. For example, these boundaries suggest that
a sentence contains a substitution if its sentence
oddity is greater than 4.6, that is if the frequency of
the sentence words without the target is more than
4.6 times the frequency of the sentence including
the target word. Similarly, a sentence contains a
substitution if its left k-gram occurs fewer than 155
times or its right k-gram occurs fewer than 612
times.
D. Performance of Individual Measures
For the Enron corpus, we use a set of 1714
ordinary sentences and 1714 sentences containing
substitutions. For the Brown corpus, we use a
set of 566 ordinary sentences and 566 sentences
containing substitutions. The set of sentences was
generated incrementally, so we were able to observe
TABLE VI
SENTENCE ODDITY PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
(%) (%)
split (10-fold) split (10-fold)
Enron 51 (57) 21 (25) 0.6672
Brown 30 (65) 15 (43) 0.6219
TABLE VII
ENHANCED SENTENCE ODDITY PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 72 (73) 23 (23) 0.7744
Brown 59 (63) 17 (18) 0.7576
the measure values as the number of sentence in-
creased. These values were remarkably stable with
respect to the size of the datasets once the number
of sentences exceeded 200, suggesting that they
would not change significantly if dataset sizes were
increased further.
Tables VI–XIV show the detection rate, that is
the percentage of sentences containing a substitution
that is detected, and the false positive rate, that
is the percentage of ordinary sentences that are
classified as containing a substitution. Two values
are provided for each rate: the first is the rate for
a 75%-25% training/test set split; the second is the
rate for 10-fold cross-validation.
We also show the area under the ROC curve
for the class of sentences containing a substitution.
This gives a sense of how well each measure is
performing with respect to the trade-off between
false rejection rate and false acceptance rate.
The sentence oddity measure is mediocre both
at detecting sentences containing substitutions and
detecting ordinary sentences, and noticeably worse
for the Brown corpus than for the Enron corpus. En-
hanced sentence oddity is a little better at detecting
sentences containing substitutions for both datasets.
The left k-gram is another weak measure for
both corpora, but the right k-gram has a significant
detection rate for the Enron corpus. The average k-
gram mixes these two measures, but produces little
improvement.
All three hypernym measures are quite weak for
9TABLE VIII
LEFT K-GRAM PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 56 (53) 33 (25) 0.6403
Brown 40 (39) 26 (26) 0.5981
TABLE IX
RIGHT K-GRAM PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 84 (81) 52 (47) 0.6791
Brown 27 (41) 9 (14) 0.6360
TABLE X
AVERAGE K-GRAM PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 56 (56) 25 (21) 0.6768
Brown 23 (50) 10 (29) 0.6237
the Enron corpus. For the Brown corpus and the
75%–25% split, both minimum and maximum hy-
pernyms predict every sentence to be ordinary. We
suspect that this is because much of the content of
the Brown corpus is formal writing. In this setting,
hypernyms of nouns tend to be extremely formal
or technical. As a result, fH tends to be small,
making the hypernym scores large and negative (and
so predicting ordinary sentences).
The maximum PMI is quite a weak measure
on the Enron corpus, but detects sentences with
substitutions very strongly on the Enron corpus
with the 75%–25% split. Again, we suspect this
is a consequence of the relatively formal sentence
structure.
Overall the results are less predictive for the
Brown corpus, but in interesting ways. The Brown
corpus was collected in 1961, and captures primarily
formal writing. It is possible that, with the passage
of time and a general loosening of the rules of
grammar, today’s text repositories do not represent
co-occurrence frequencies well for such data. It may
also be that phrases have remained in use over
this time period, so that measures such as PMI
that access deeper structures in sentences are less
TABLE XI
MINIMUM HYPERNYM ODDITY PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 66 (45) 52 (33) 0.5735
Brown 0 (43) 0 (41) 0.5522
TABLE XII
MAXIMUM HYPERNYM ODDITY PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 57 (55) 30 (29) 0.6330
Brown 0 (52) 0 (45) 0.5627
TABLE XIII
AVERAGE HYPERNYM ODDITY PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 43 (42) 21 (21) 0.6068
Brown 42 (40) 20 (25) 0.5742
TABLE XIV
MAXIMUM PMI PERFORMANCE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
Enron 49 (54) 24 (23) 0.7064
Brown 99 (67) 69 (43) 0.6989
affected.
Since our primary objective was not to compare
existing measures but rather to suggest our own
measures to tackle this novel task, we did not
compute the statistical significance of the perfor-
mance of the measures we have suggested. Given
the stability of the results with respect to the number
of sentences and the unlimited availability of the
data for testing, we are confident that any necessary
level of statistical significance can be established by
following the same methodology.
E. Combining Predictors
Most of the measures described in the previous
subsection perform poorly at detecting sentences
with substitutions, or detecting ordinary sentences,
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TABLE XV
OVERALL PERFORMANCE: DECISION TREE
False Area
Corpus Detection Positive under the
Rate Rate ROC curve
(%) (%)
split (10-fold) split (10-fold)
Enron 95 (94) 11 (11) 0.9844
Brown 84 (91) 16 (15) 0.9838
Fig. 1. ROC curve for Enron corpus combined predictor
or both. Fortunately, these measures look for dif-
ferent sentence properties, so they make errors on
different sentences. As a result, when the measures
are combined, prediction accuracy is very high.
We consider two different methods of combining
the individual measures. A decision tree using all of
the measure values as attributes applies information
gain criteria to selecting the measures and applying
them in an effective order. The performance of
decision trees trained on all of the measures is
shown in Table XV. In the Enron corpus, this
combination of measures can detect sentences con-
taining a substitution with accuracies in the mid-
ninety percent range, with a false positive rate of
around ten percent. Performance is worse for the
Brown corpus.
Figures 1 and 2 show ROC curves for the Enron
and Brown corpora respectively. The sharp knee in
the upper left hand corner of each shows how well
these combined measures perform.
Fig. 2. ROC curve for Brown corpus combined predictor
Our second method of combining measures is to
use a random forest [16]. Random forests grow large
numbers of unpruned decision trees, using samples
drawn from the original data with replacement, until
the full size of the training data is reached. Typically
about one-third of the objects are never selected,
and these act as an immediate test set. A fixed
number of candidate attributes are chosen afresh for
the construction of each tree node, with the best
being chosen in the usual way. This method of con-
struction prevents random forests from overfitting
the data, and ensures that important attributes play
an important role, while those with little predictive
power do not.
A random forest with 50 trees, and a branch
size (i.e. Mtry) of 4 was trained on a dataset of
all of the measure values, using a 75%-25% split.
Its performances are shown in Table XVI. For
the Enron corpus, combining the measures using
a random forest has a detection rate in the low
ninety percents, with a false positive rate around ten
percent, comparable to the combined decision tree.
Again, the results for the Brown corpus are worse.
F. Discussion
By manually inspecting the first 100 sen-
tences from the Enron corpus, we discovered that
there were three approximately equally contributing
sources of classification errors:
1) The original sentences were either not gram-
matically correct or too short, and so seemed
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TABLE XVI
OVERALL PERFORMANCE: RANDOM FOREST
False
Corpus Detection Positive
Rate Rate
(%) (%)
split split
Enron 90 11
Brown 83 13
unusual even before substitution, for example
“body and the other in jpg”.
2) The substituted word was the only word in
the sentence that was not a stopword or some
other very frequent word. Thus there was no
visible change in the values of the measures,
for example “investigation me if you need any
more input”.
3) The substitution was, by coincidence, not con-
textually unusual.
All of the sources of errors seem to result from
properties of the test data used and the way in
which we create sentences with substitutions, rather
than from the weaknesses in the measures used.
This suggest that we have achieved approximately
the upper bound of performance for the family of
measures that we studied and the datasets that we
used.
Detecting substitutions is a difficult problem, so
it is not surprising that individual measures perform
quite poorly. However, different measures look for
different kinds of contextual discontinuities and so
make errors in different sentences. When the indi-
vidual measure scores are combined in an ensemble,
the overall performance is much better than that of
any individual measure.
We did not include measures based on Hidden
Markov Models, which are popular in speech recog-
nition, for two reasons. First, PMI measures can
be considered as generalizations of Markov models
since they look at co-occurrences on both sides,
rather than only on the left side as speech recogni-
tion models do. Second, tests with Markov models
on the Enron corpus indicated than they performed
approximately 20-30% worse than PMI-based mea-
sures. We are leaving for future research more
detailed comparison and incorporation of HMMs
into a combined classification model.
We also ran almost all of the above tests using
MSN as the frequency oracle and obtained essen-
tially the same results. This indicates that, although
discrepancies between the search engines may exist,
the choice of oracle does not affect the performance
of the measures based on phrase frequencies. This
is not surprising since the measures are based on
ratios, and the task itself is noisy. This finding is
consistent with similar findings that use frequency
information for other text-mining tasks, for exam-
ple, for fact seeking [17]. The finding also suggests
that combining several oracles may improve the
results slightly, but we leave that for future research.
The false positive rate is the performance-limiting
component of such ensembles, since the overwhelm-
ing majority of sentences in real applications will
not contain substitutions. For example, if 1 sentence
in a million contains a substitution, then a false pos-
itive rate of 10% selects 100,000 innocent sentences
as well as (almost certainly) the one suspicious
sentence.
However, even with a significant false positive
rate, the application of an ensemble of measures
acts as a filter to reduce the fraction of messages
that need to be considered by subsequent analysis.
Furthermore, the words(s) suspected of being sub-
stitutions can be labelled by the ensemble, making
subsequent examination even easier. For example,
words suspected of being substitutions could be
color-coded to make it easier and faster for a human
analyst to decide whether or not they were suspi-
cious.
There is a further opportunity to compensate
for weaknesses in the ensemble performance by
considering how classification of sentences is used
to determine classification of entire messages. For
example, if we use the criterion that a message is
suspicious if it contains one sentence with a sub-
stitution, and we assume that the average message
length is ten sentences, then a false positive rate
of 10% selects almost every message as suspicious.
On the other hand, with a detection rate of 90%, the
possibility of missing a message that does contain
a substitution is vanishingly small: 10−10. If the
criterion that a message is suspicious is weakened
to requiring that it contains at least three sentences
containing a substitution (which is quite reasonable
in practice since a message is about a topic, and
this topic may be the thing that must be concealed),
then the false positive rate per message drops to
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around 1.2%. This reduces the amount of text to be
processed further by more than a factor of 8.
We have experimented with replacing words by
new words of significantly different frequency. In
preliminary results, replacing a noun with a noun
whose rank is half that of the word it replaces
produces performances similar to those reported
here. Replacing a noun by a noun whose rank is
twice that of the noun it replaces appears to make
detecting substitutions a little easier. We expect
that this is at least partly because the replacement
word is automatically rarer, and so inherently more
unusual in any context. We are continuing to explore
these issues.
Since our objective was to explore the feasibility
of this approach, we were not concerned with real-
time response. The complete run of our test set took
many hours for each individual measure. The bot-
tleneck is querying the underlying search engines,
which was necessarily parallelized on multiple sys-
tems. Runtime would be much improved with direct
access to the search engine.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The problem of detecting when word substitution
has occurred has a role to play in settings such as
counterterrorism and law enforcement, where large
amounts of message traffic may be intercepted in
an automated way, and it is desirable to reduce the
number of messages to which further analysis must
be applied. The existence of simple mechanisms
such as watchlists of significant words may actually
make the discovery of illicit groups easier, because
they must react to the existence of watchlists while
innocent groups are either unaware of them, or do
not alter their messages.
If the goal of illicit groups is to evade automated
detection, then it is important that the word sub-
stitutions should look as normal as possible from
a syntactic perspective (whereas if humans were
searching for suspicious messages, a much more
semantic form of substitution would be required).
We have addressed the problem of detecting the
kind of substitutions that might be made in response
to watchlist scanning: replacing words with words
of similar frequency. Such substitutions are quite
effective in obfuscating content, as demonstrated by
the low detection rates and high positive rates of
most of the measures we have designed. However,
these families of measures make errors on different
sentences so that, when they are combined, the
overall detection rates are close to 90% or better and
the false positive rates fall to around 10%. These
rates make the combined predictors usable at the
scale of messages.
English is extremely variable, so that there are
examples of extremely unusual sentences, especially
in the Enron email corpus. So, in a sense, it is
not surprising that it is so difficult to detect abnor-
mal combinations of words caused by substitution,
since many ordinary sentences also contain abnor-
mal combinations. This variability also means that
many ordinary sentences, and indeed fragments of
sentences, are not captured by search engines, so we
are unable to estimate their frequencies. This also
limits the performance of the measures.
Although the Brown corpus contains more formal
writing, it is not easier to detect substitutions in this
setting. This is perhaps surprising, but may reflect
changes in language patterns, properties of formal
writing or both.
Although this work has been based on English
sentences, there seems no strong reason why the
results should not extend to other languages, es-
pecially uninflected languages where word order is
important. Frequency oracles for other languages are
available, but are based on much smaller samples of
texts.
A number of limitation have been mentioned
throughout the paper, and we are planning to address
them in future research. Some specific issues are:
testing substitutions of verbs rather than nouns,
analyzing groups of messages instead of single ones,
applying parsers to find important relations between
words that we now approximate using k-grams, test-
ing multiple substitutions within a single sentence
(for example, “The alcohol is in the bar” instead
of “the bomb is in position”), using a wider variety
of test sets, and testing specific known ‘red flag’
terms. It will be also interesting to investigate how
correlation between substitutions can be exploited to
increase accuracy, and perhaps even to guess what
original words were replaced.
We believe that measures to detect substitution
can be used in other applications involving auto-
mated text analysis, such as deception detection,
authorship identification, data de-identification, psy-
chiatry, and analysis of financial reports.
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